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This paper examines the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to supply 
crude oil to an unintegrated downstream rival, using a stylized model based 
on the Brent market and UK oil taxation. Market analysts claim that crude 
oil trading by integrated firms is mainly tax-induced (tax spinning), thereby 
neglecting the effect of strategic interaction that induces vertical foreclosure in 
game-theoretical models. I show that in a two-stage game where the integrated 
firm moves first and the second stage is constituted by a Cournot game, the 
conditions behind vertical supply are more restrictive than the tax spinning 
hypothesis assumes.
*1 am grateful to seminar participants at the Eui for a stimulating discussion and to 























































































































































































In their review of Models of the Oil Market, Jacques Cremer and Djavad 
Salehi-Isfahani (1991) conclude that the next task of oil economists should 
be to apply techniques of strategic interaction that are now widely used 
in industrial economics. This request also implies the study of the indus­
trial organization of oil markets with game-theoretic tools. This paper 
examines the incentives of a vertically integrated oil firm to supply crude 
oil to an unintegrated refining rival, which is completely dependent on the 
integrated firm’s supply. Strategic interaction is invoked by duopolistic 
competition in the refining industry. There are powerful incentives for the 
integrated firm to cut off its crude oil supplies, i.e. to vertically foreclose 
its rival. By doing so it creates a second monopoly in the refining industry 
and earns the monopoly rent accruing to the vertical chain. The setting 
of this paper is based on a highly stylized abstraction from the Brent 
market. The market structure in the Brent market is oligopolistic, and 
one of its important features is the interaction of vertically integrated ma­
jors with unintegrated, independent firms. There is a widespread opinion 
among oil market analysts that crude oil trading by integrated oil compa­
nies is primarily motivated by the drive to minimise the companies’ tax 
bill under the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) tax regime.1 
The practice of selling a part of its crude oil production in the market 
and buying from it to satisfy remaining refining needs is known as tax 
spinning. However, the tax spinning hypothesis does not recognize the 
strategic impact vertical supply decisions have on the integrated firm’s 
profit from its refining business. One of the major issues addressed in this 
paper is whether the tax spinning hypothesis survives the application of 
game-theoretic tools within a framework built upon partial integration 
and the UKCS tax regime. The model has two stages. The integrated 
firm acts first by committing to a crude oil price that it charges the un­
1A typical statement is the following quotation from the Weekly Petroleum Argus, 
a market analyst journal that refers to the major oil companies (Shell, BP, Exxon, 
Chevron, Texaco and Mobil) that are all ” UK North Sea equity producers and use the 
market to balance their short term supply position and optimise their tax exposure” 




























































































integrated downstream rival. Crude oil production and crude oil refining 
are sequential stages. The extraction and transportation of wet barrels 
to the refining gates consumes time. This strengthens the credibility of 
the crude price commitment made by the integrated firm. In making its 
crude price decision, the integrated firm takes into account the output 
adjustment of its refining rival. The second stage is a Cournot game be­
tween the refiner and the integrated firm. The motivation to foreclose 
rivals is related to the concept of raising rivals cost, developed by Salop 
and Scheffman (1983, 1987) who claim that ’’ vertical price squeezes can 
be viewed as conduct to raise rival’s costs” (1983:268).
Vertical Foreclosure is a contested policy issue. Arguing in the tradi­
tion of the Chicago-School, Bork (1978), for example, claims that vertical 
mergers and vertical foreclosure do not have any anticompetitive impact 
and should be viewed from an efficiency perspective only. Vertical fore­
closure has been explicitly addressed in a couple of recent papers using 
game-theoretic approaches. The conclusion of these papers is that a ver­
tically integrated firm cuts off its supplies to downstream firms.2 In a very 
interesting contribution, Spencer and Jones (1991) observe that, within 
an international trade policy setting, a tax on the export of the interme­
diate good encourages vertical supply. This result suggests that vertical 
foreclosure might depend on the concrete institutional setting. This in­
sight is supported by the examination of the UK oil taxation regime. The 
conditions under which vertical supply or tax spinning can arise are, how­
ever, more restrictive than is claimed by the tax spinning hypothesis. A 
central role is played by the difference between the so-called tax price and 
the crude oil price at which foreclosure arises, the difference between the 
tax price and the refined products price, and the level of the Petroleum 
Revenue Tax-rate.
The next section describes the UKCS tax regime and develops the 
tax spinning hypothesis as discussed in the informal literature. Section 
3 gives an outline of the model. The Cournot equilibrium in the refining 
industry and some useful comparative statics results are derived in section
2See Salinger (1988) and Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990). Papers building upon 
the incomplete contract literature also demonstrate that market foreclosure can be an 




























































































4. Section 5 deals with the optimal pricing decision of the integrated firm 
at the first stage and develops the conditions under which it will supply 
its rival with crude oil. Section 6 considers very recent changes in the UK 
tax system and its effects on vertical supply and tax spinning. Section 7 
contains concluding remarks.
2 The Tax Regime in the UK Continental 
Shelf
2.1 The Institutional and Legal Framework
The oil taxation regime in the United Kingdom (UK) continental shelf is 
not neutral with respect to the behaviour of vertically integrated compa­
nies. The government imposes a special tax system on North Sea activities 
in order to recover part of the economic rent arising from the exploitation 
of oil fields. This system contains three elements:3
• royalties,
• the petroleum revenue tax (PRT), and
• the corporation tax (CT).
Royalties are levied in kind or cash and are treated as a cost item 
when the tax liabilities for PRT or CT are computed. The PRT is con­
structed as a profit tax levied oil field by oil field. The UK tax regime 
establishes a fiscal ring fence around every oil field for the PRT so that 
profits and losses incurred on one oil field cannot be compensated by prof­
its or losses made on another field. A ring-fence around the upstream ac­
tivities of integrated companies is established for CT-purposes, implying 
that losses arising downstream, i.e. in oil refining, products wholesaling 
and retailing, cannot be offset against upstream profits. The tax rates 
of the PRT and CT are constant, and there are very few elements of 
progression build into the tax base. Table 1 gives the series of nominal
3See Kay and King 1980, Mabro et al. 1986, Rowland and Hann 1987, Horsnell 




























































































Year C T -R a te P R T -R ate U pstream  R ate
1975 52 % 45 % 73,6 %
1976 52 % 45 % 73,6 %
1977 52 % 45 % 73,6 %
1978 52 % 45 % 73,6 %
1979 52 % 60 % 80,8 %
1980 52 % 70 % 85,6 %
1981 52 % 70 % 85,6 %
1982 52 % 70 % 85,6 %
1983 50 % 75 % 87,5 %
1984 45 % 75 % 86,25 %
1985 40 % 75 % 85 %
1986 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1987 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1988 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1989 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1990 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1991 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1992 35 % 75 % 83,75 %
1993 35 % 50 % 67,5 %
Source: Rowland and Hann (1987), Favero (1991), Horsnell and Mabro 
(1993), own calculations




























































































PRT, CT and computed upstream tax rates for the period beginning with 
the implementation of the Oil Taxation Act 1975 until 1993. From 1975 
through 1978, the PRT-rate was constantly set at 45%. In 1979, it rose 
sharply to 60%, while 1980 saw another increase of around 17% up to a 
level of 70%. The last increase came 1983 when the PRT-rate reached 
its historical peak with 75%, where it remained until March 1993 when 
the first decrease ever brought the rate down onto a level of 50%, thereby 
marking a sharp swing in Britain’s tax policy towards the oil industry. 
Of special interest is the period 1978 to 1980 with a total increase in the 
PRT-rate of around 55% and the sudden reduction in 1993 of around 
one-third. The development of the CT-rate was much steadier. Begin­
ning from a level of 52%, it saw a steady decline, furnished by tax policy 
committed to supply-side economics that started in 1983 and ended in 
1986 when the CT-rate eventually hit its floor of 35%. The following two 
features of the oil fiscal regime are especially relevant for the behaviour 
of integrated firms on the intermediate good market.
D ifferential tax rates Profits incurred in the upstream division 
of a vertically integrated company are subject to both the PRT and CT, 
while downstream profits are taxed only according to CT. Independent 
of the actual tax rates of PRT and CT, the total tax rate on upstream 
activities is always higher than on downstream operations. The differ­
ential between the downstream rate, which is simply the CT-rate, and 
the computed nominal upstream tax-rate can be inferred from the in­
formation provided in Table l .4 Throughout the period considered, the 
upstream rate was considerably higher, reaching a peak of 87.5% in 1983. 
The difference between upstream and downstream taxes provide a pow­
erful incentive for integrated oil companies to transfer as much profits as 
possible downstream to their refinery operations.
4The effective tax rate is, due to allowances, tax credits, etc. lower than the nom­
inal rate. However, the latter is equal to the marginal rate, and since the analysis 
carried out in later sections is marginal analysis, the focus is on the nominal rate here. 
The various attempts to improve the advance of tax payments introduced by the gov­
ernment throughout the period under consideration as the Supplementary Petroleum 
Duty and the Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax are not taken into account. See Mabro 




























































































V aluation and tax  spinning In order to obtain profit figures 
for PRT and CT purposes, the crude oil output must be valued. The 
valuation of crude oil production is based on market prices,
that is (a) on price realized in the sale of the oil liable to tax 
in a genuine arm’s length deal, or (b) on an assessment by the 
Oil Taxation Office of the market price of similar transactions 
when the oil liable to tax is appropriated by the producer, 
transferred or sold in a non-arm’s length transaction (Horsnell 
and Mabro 1993:62).
To assign a value based on market prices for output disposed of 
through an internal transfer from upstream to downstream units of an 
integrated company, the UK Oil Taxation Office (OTO) has until 1984 
considered the contemporary term price posted by the British National 
Oil Company (BNOC) as the artificial market reference price for such 
transactions.5 In 1984, the BNOC term price was considered as no longer 
representative for the market, and in 1987 a new valuation method was 
introduced by OTO.6 A vertically integrated company has the option to 
sell crude oil output to third parties through a market transaction (a so 
called ’’ arm’s length deal” ) or to transfer its crude oil output internally 
to its downstream unit. Mabro et al. (1986) and Horsnell and Mabro 
(1993) argue that the UK tax regime has a profound impact on the choice 
between these two options and is the main motivation behind a famous 
practice known as tax spinning. Tax spinning refers to a practice where 
an vertically integrated oil firm is selling a part of its crude oil output to 
the crude market (’’ third parties” ), rather than transferring the output 
internally to its own refineries and satisfying its remaining refining needs 
for crude oil partly by purchases on the crude oil market.
5See section 5 for a discussion of the market reference price. BNOC was established 
in 1975 and existed until 1982 when its upstream operations were privatised. For the 
pricing and trading role of BNOC within the insitutional framework of the North Sea 
oil markets see Mabro et al. (1986).




























































































2.2 Tax Parameters and Gains from Tax Spinning
There are three parameters set or defined by the tax authorities, the 
PRT-rate, the CT-rate and the tax-assessment price. It is assumed that 
transaction costs incurred by selling and buying crude oil on the market 
are negligible and therefore set equal to zero. I follow Mabro et al. (1986) 
to compute the tax liability of an integrated company from the two op­
tions available, internal use and market trade or spinning. The notation 
used in this paper is:
z refined products price
constant marginal cost of crude oil production,
c
constant internal transfer price 
p crude oil price
tc CT-rate, constant
tp PRT-rate, constant
pa tax (assessment) price for internal transfers 
r =  (tp +  tc — tptc) , total upstream tax rate 
X  total refining industry output
share of internally transferred crude oil of total 
integrated refining output 
1 firm 1, unintegrated refiner
v firm v, integrated firm
q crude oil sales to firm 1 by firm v.
Internal transfer The tax liability T\ other than royalties, from 
the internal transfer of a given amount of crude oil by the integrated firm 
is
T  =  (pa - c ) t p + [(/>“ -  c) (l -  tp)] tc +  ( z -  pa) tc.
The first term in this expression gives the PRT liability for upstream 
operations, where the tax authority has assessed a tax price pa and crude 
oil production cost c are a deductible allowance against both PRT and CT. 
The second term gives CT liability of upstream operations, where the PRT 
liability is an allowance against CT. Finally, the third term represents 




























































































the assessed purchase cost of crude oil pa, is deducted from the tax bill 
(it is assumed, without loss of generality, that the cost of transforming 
crude oil into refined products is constant and equal to zero). The term 
(z —pa) t c is only relevant if it is positive, since due to the fiscal ring- 
fence, a downstream loss cannot be set against upstream profits.7 This 
expression reduces to
r  =  (pa - c ) T  +  ( z - p a) t c, ( i )
where r =  (tp +  tc — tptc) is the upstream tax rate. Until the middle of 
the 1980s, the Oil Taxation Office determined pa by using the term price 
posted by the British National Oil Company (BNOC) as the relevant tax 
price.
Tax Spinning The tax liability T s, again without taking royal­
ties into account, of selling the amount of crude oil to a third party on 
the crude oil market and buying the crude amount necessary to run the 
refining operations from another party is
Ts =  (p -  c) t +  (z - p )  tc_ ■ (2 )
>o
Compared with (1), the tax-assessment price is replaced in (2) by the 
crude oil price p realized in a market deal.
The difference in tax liabilities from both options is given by sub­
tracting (2) from (1) :
T - T ‘  =  (jpa - p ) ( l -  tc) tp. (3)
Equation (3) shows that tax spinning is the tax-optimal option for given 
PRT and CT- rates if p < pa, since in this case the difference in (3) is 
positive, implying a higher tax liability for the internal disposal of a given 
barrel of crude oil. If the tax price exceeds the market price for a barrel 
of crude oil to be disposed, tax spinning results in a lower tax liability, 
independent of the values of the PRT-rate and CT-rate.





























































































Mabro et al. (1986) claim that, from equation (3), the condition 
p < pa amounts to ’’ the only necessary condition for a pure tax gain 
to arise from spinning” against internal transfers. If it is assumed that 
transaction costs were negligible,8 the condition p < pa logically becomes 
the ’’ only necessary” condition for an overall economic gain from tax spin­
ning. They argue that the ’’ simple economics of tax spinning is such as 
to make the practice almost irresistible” (1986:126) and provide detailed 
information about seven distinct periods during which there was a differ­
ential between the tax-price and the market price for Brent and which 
saw an increase in third-party sales by the integrated companies on the 
Brent market. The claim that p < pa is the necessary and sufficient condi­
tion for spinning to be profitable, constitutes the core of the tax spinning 
hypothesis. Moreover, there is a widespread view that tax spinning is not 
only the major explanation for the trading activity of integrated oil firms, 
but also for the emergence of the rather sophisticated spot and forward 
markets for Brent blend.9
3 Vertical Foreclosure: The Model
The basic setting of the model follows Spencer and Jones (1991) who 
analyse vertical foreclosure in an international trade policy framework. 
There are three players, two firms and a government that chooses the 
tax parameters. The vertically integrated oil firm, labelled it, refines 
crude oil products in competition with a non-integrated downstream rival, 
firm 1. Firm v is a monopolist on the crude oil market and potentially 
supplies part of its crude oil production externally to firm 1. It is assumed 
that firm 1 has no possibility to acquire the necessary crude oil input 
from other sources. Neither can firm 1 integrate backward and produce 
crude oil itself. It is thus locked into the vertical supply relationship with
8If transaction costs exists, Mabro et al. (1986) show that for ” an overall pure 
gain to arise” (meaning an economic profit from spinning), the condition pa — p > 
transaction costs must be met;. They argue that a small difference between the tax-
l P
assessment price and the market price is sufficient to create an economic gain from 
tax spinning.




























































































the integrated major v. This assumption is introduced to make vertical 
foreclosure as easy or tempting as possible for the vertically integrated 
firm to analyse whether even in this extreme setting, vertical supply can 
arise. Assuming that the independent refiner is totally dependent on 
the major’s crude supplies makes it a most simple exercise for the major 
to establish a second monopoly in the refining industry by pricing its 
potential crude oil supply so high that the independent firm exits the 
market. Moreover, this foreclosure incentive provides a useful benchmark 
to compare this solution with the equilibrium under the tax system. The 
assumption that there is a monopolist has further implications for the tax 
treatment of firm v's internal transfers.
Technology is represented by fixed-coefficients, and one unit of crude 
oil is required to produce one unit of refined products. Crude oil is con­
sidered to be the only input into the refining process. The cost of trans­
forming crude oil into refined products is assumed to be zero, without 
loss of generality. Firm v produces crude oil at a constant marginal cost 
c which is also equal to the internal transfer price at which crude oil is 
transferred from v's upstream to its downstream units. Hence, v refines 
at marginal cost c, whereas firm 1 has to pay the market price p to obtain 
crude oil. Since p is monopolistically set by v, it will never be less than 
c, so there is an asymmetry in downstream costs.
The model is a two-stage game with complete information. The 
equilibria of each stage are required to be subgame-perfect in the sense 
of Selten (1975) and are solved recursively. In the first stage, firm v 
chooses a price p at which it sells crude oil to firm 1, taking the stage 
2-equilibrium into account. The announcement of price p is a credible 
commitment, given the perfectness of the equilibrium of this subgame. 
The stage 2-subgame is a duopoly game where both firms v and 1 compete 
in quantities of refined products and the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is 
non-cooperative.
There is a difference between the concepts of vertical supply, verti­
cal foreclosure, and tax spinning. Vertical foreclosure is given when the 
integrated firm charges a crude oil price, p, at which the independent firm 




























































































market. Roughly, this situation is given whenever the refinery netback 
becomes negative, 2 <  p.10 * Note that a change of the intermediate good 
price has an impact on the condition under which the refining industry 
operates, and hence on 2 . By increasing p , the major increases the inde­
pendent firm’s input cost, while its own cost function is unaffected. An 
increase in p induces firm 1 to cut back its output, while it induces the 
integrated firm to increase its output. These effects are made explicit in 
section 5. Suffice it to say that the final good price 2 shifts upward when 
the major increases the crude oil price. Thus, to make the difference 
2 — p negative, the major has to increase the crude price more than the 
products price 2 increases as a response to the increase in p.
Pure vertical supply but without tax spinning, is given when the 
vertically integrated firm charges a crude oil price at which the indepen­
dent firm wants to produce a positive amount in the refined products 
market, p < p. There are, in addition to internal transfers, strictly pos­
itive external sales by the major. The difference between pure vertical 
supply and vertical supply with tax spinning is that in the spinning case 
the integrated firm v also purchases crude oil in the open market for tax 
reasons. The integrated oil firm is at the same time the sole seller and 
one of two buyers of crude oil, while the netback is favourable enough for 
the independent firm to produce a strictly positive output and demand a 
strictly positive crude oil input.11
The advocates of the tax spinning hypothesis neglect the impact of 
strategic interaction that inevitably is connected with the decision to use 
the crude oil market as an instrument for tax optimisation practices. Bu- 
low, Geanakoplos and Klemperer observe that ’’ changes in a firm’s oppor­
tunities in one market may affect its profits by influencing its competitors’ 
(or potential competitors’ ) strategies in a second market (1985:488-9)” .
10Since crude processing and transport costs are assumed to be zero, the netback is 
given by the difference between the products price z and the crude oil price p.
n I model crude oil as standard, renewable commodity. The introduction of a de­
pletion constraint in the fashion of Hotelling (1931) and the resulting scarcity rent 
cannot explain current world oil prices (see Adelman 1986). Cremer and Salehi- 
Isfahani (1991) even count the irrelevance of exhaustibility as a basic building block 




























































































An integrated oil firm does not set after-tax marginal revenue equal to 
after-tax marginal cost if its crude oil market actions when it foresees the 
effect any of its upstream decisions has on its rival’s actions and thus on 
its own profits from refining operations. In other words, it considers the 
strategic effect its action on the crude oil market has on its profits from 
refining. In section 5, this strategic effect is made explicit.
4 Cournot Equilibrium in the Refining In­
dustry
The price z of the final good output is given by the inverse demand func­
tion 2 =  z (X ),where 2 is downward sloping, z'(X ) <  0, and X  =  x l +  xv 
represents total downstream output of refined products, and x1 and xv 
denote final good output by the non-integrated firm 1 and the integrated 
firm v, respectively.12 Each of the rivals would prefer to produce a 
small amount of refined output if it were a monopoly in this market, 
z(0) > max [p, c] 13.The pre-tax profit of firm 1 is the difference between 
total revenue and cost, and this profit is taxed at the constant CRT-rate 
tc.After-tax profit is given by
II1 =  (z (X )x 1 -  px1) (1 -  tc) . (4)
The construction of firm v's profit function is more involved. First, the 
pre-tax profit from refining and crude oil production is,
IF =  z (X )xv +  p q — c[xv +  q]. (5)
The first term on the right-hand side in (5) represents revenue from selling 
total refined output, the next term gives total revenue from selling crude 
oil production to the independent downstream rival 1, and the third term 
represents the total cost of crude oil production, where xv is internally 
allocated and q is sold on the external crude oil market. Let (5) be aug­
mented by the profit arising from a transaction comprising external sales
12A prime denotes a total derivative, and subscripts denote partial derivatives.




























































































of crude oil by the upstream unit, followed by a compensatory purchase 
of these sales by the downstream unit. Denote by xv'x refined products 
output produced by using internally transferred crude oil, and by xv'e 
output produced by purchasing the crude requirements via the crude oil 
market. Then (5) becomes
IP =  [2(A) -  c] xv'1 +  [p -  c] q +  [2(A) -  p] xv'e +  \p -  c] xv'e, (6)
where (p — c)xv,e is the upstream revenue from selling crude oil to the 
downstream unit. Note that total crude oil sales are given by q +  xv,e, and 
crude oil production by q +  xv,e +  xv'1. Consolidating up- and downstream 
profits in (6) gives [z (X ) -  c] xv,e, and by using the identity xv’1 +  xv’e =  
xv, this leads back to equation (5). In the absence of costs of using 
the crude oil market, the integrated firm’s profit is not affected whether 
oil is sold externally on the market and purchased back externally, or 
channeled internally from u’s producing to its refining operations. If, 
however, there were the slightest transaction cost involved, and much 
of the literature on vertical integration refers to transaction cost as a 
motivation for integrated production, internal transfers become the cost- 
minimising option.14
If the integrated firm operates under the tax regime in the UK, a 
simple consolidation of external sales and purchases in one profit expres­
sion is no longer possible, and the equivalence between external transac­
tions and internal transfers breaks down. The UK oil tax regime drives a 
wedge between the different strategies of transferring crude oil from the 
integrated firm’s production to its refining stage. Rewriting (6) to take 
account of the tax-regime yields
IP =  [2(A) -  c -  (2(A) -  pa) tc -  (jpa -  c) r] xv'' +  [(p -  c) (1 -  r)] q 
+  [(2(A) -  p) (1 -  tc)] xv,e +  [{P -  c) (1 -  t )] xv'e,
(7)
As in (6), the identity xv’1 +  xv,e =  xv also holds in (7). Since it 
makes one of the variables involved redundant, it is possible to redefine 
the variables as follows: xv,i =  9xv, xv’e =  (1 -  9)xv, where 9 represents
14This, however, assumes that the cost of carrying out the transfer within the inte­




























































































the share, given the total downstream production of refined products by 
v, of internally transferred and refined crude oil, and (1 — 9) represents 
the share of crude oil bought on the external market and subsequently 
refined. 9 assumes a determined value for the marginal cases where (i) all 
refining needs are satisfied by internal transfers [6 — 1) or (ii) where all 
refining needs are satisfied by purchases on the external market (9 =  0). 
For the hybrid cases, 9 will be in the interval 0 <  9 <  1. The tax system 
imposes an important restriction upon 9. The Oil Taxation Office accepts 
only those market transactions establishing a market price for the crude 
oil liable to tax that fulfill certain conditions:
(T)he deal must qualify as ’arm’s length’ by fulfilling all 
the following conditions: (a) the contract price is the sole 
consideration for the sale; (b) the sale is between unconnected 
parties; (c) neither the seller (nor any person connected) has 
any interest in the subsequent resale of oil or any produce 
derived from it (Horsnell and Mabro 1993, p. 62).
Thus, according to (b), deals between subsidiaries of the same com­
pany, such as between the upstream and downstream division of an in­
tegrated firm, do not qualify as arm’s length. Since there is only one 
upstream producer, this condition could never be fulfilled. To get around 
this point, it is therefore assumed that if there were only one producer 
upstream, the OTO would suspend condition (b) provided, however, that 
there is at least one other unconnected party that is also an active buyer 
in the crude oil market. One might think of this argument in terms of 
the anonymity the Brent market provides to disconnect the deals made 
between the upstream and downstream departments of integrated firm. 
Horsnell and Mabro (1993) even argue that the need to separate a tax- 
motivated oil sale from a compensatory purchase by mingling them to­
gether with other genuine third-party deals is partly responsible for the 
birth of the Brent market. This market separation advantage disappears 
once the independent rival firm 1 is foreclosed from the crude oil market, 
i.e. his crude oil demand is reduced to zero. Then, the OTO would find 
it impossible to deny any connection between the integrated firm’s up­




























































































the market and would therefore not accept any such transaction as being 
arm’s length. Since this removes the fiscal motivation for purchases of 
crude requirements on the external market for v, and since it was argued 
above that there are no other incentives for external transactions at work, 
vertical foreclosure implies that all crude requirements are transferred in­
ternally, i.e. for the foreclosure case 8 =  1.
Recall that xv is not equal to total upstream production of crude 
oil, since the potential external sales to the rival firm 1, q, have to be 
taken into account. Then, the identity becomes
xv =  8xv +  (1 -  8)x \  
and (7) can be rewritten to yield
IIv =  8 xv [z (X ) — c — (z (X ) —  pa) tc —  (pa — c) t]
+(1 ~ 0)xv K*PO “  P) (1 “  to) +  ( p - c ) { l -  r)] (8)
+  [ ( p -  c) (1 -  r)]q.
The bracketed expression in the first line of the right-hand side of
(8) gives the after tax profit from internally transferring, refining and sell­
ing the amount of crude oil. The first term in the bracket, z(X ) —c, gives 
the pre-tax economic profit from selling crude oil which was internally 
bought at transfer price c. Due to the internal character of this transac­
tion, the tax authority imposes a downstream tax payment of (z — pa)tc, 
where the taxation office imputes a tax price pa for this transaction. The 
same tax price is used to compute the upstream tax liability (pa — c)r. 
The first term in the bracket in the second line of (8) gives the down­
stream unit’s after-tax profit from selling refined products for which the 
crude oil requirements were bought at price p on the external market. 
This corresponds to the profit from internally transferred oil, with the 
exception that now the tax office takes the market price as the tax price 
for assessing the tax liability. The second term in the bracket in the sec­
ond line gives the upstream after-tax profit figure from crude oil sales to 
the downstream unit of v, where, again, the tax price equals the realized 
market price. Finally, the term in the third line of (8) gives the after-tax 





























































































IT =  xv [z(X) -  c -  (z{X ) - p ) t c - ( p -  c) t} +  [(p -  c) (1 -  r)] q
-9  xv (Pa -P )  (*P(1 -  tc))
=(r-<c)
0 )
The first term on the right-hand side of (9) shows after tax-profit from 
sales of refined products, taxed as if these were transformed by using only 
internally transferred crude oil, the second term represents profits from 
sales of crude oil to firm 1. The third term in (9) is, when 9 >  0, negative 
for pa > p, positive for pa < p , and becomes zero for 9 =  0. Hence, if the 
tax-price exceeds the market price, this difference, taxed at the differential 
of up- and downstream taxes (r — tc) =  (fp(l — tc)) and multiplied by the 
amount of internally transferred oil, contributes negatively to the total 
after-tax profit. In this case, since the tax price for internal transactions 
pa is higher than the tax price for external transactions p, this expression 
provides a tax punishment of internal transfer. If, on the other hand, the 
difference (p“ —p) is negative, there is a tax reward for internal transfers. 
Finally, if in (9) the tax parameters tc and tp are set equal to zero, (9) 
reduces to equation (5).
Firms 1 and v set their quantities to maximise their profits (4) and
(9) given the value of p to which the integrated firm has itself committed 
in its production stage-1 choice of p, and the tax-parameters tc, tp, and 
pa. The first-order conditions are
n j =  (z +  x1z' -  pj (1 -  tc) =  0 &  z + x 1z ' - p  =  0 (10)
and
n : =  p +  Xvz'(l — tc) — 6 [(pa -  p) (fp(i -  tc))} =  0, (11)
where p =  (z — c — (z — p) tc — (p — c) t) . The corresponding second- 
order conditions are
n }1 = 2 z' +  x h "  (12)
and
=  pv +  (1  -  tc)z' +  x vz"( 1 -  tc)




























































































The second-order conditions for a global maximum are II-,- <  0, i =  
l,v . The Cournot equilibrium is the set of self-enforcing actions in the 
quantity space from which neither firm 1 nor firm v would individually 
want to deviate. It is found as the simultaneous solution to (10) and (11):
x1 =  xl (jp,tc,tp,pa), xv =  xv(p,tc,tp,pa). (14)
The Cournot equilibrium strategies depend on the crude price p that 
is charges in stage 1 and the tax parameters tp,tc and p" that are set 
before the crude oil market meets. To perform comparative statics, the 
existence, stability, and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium must be 
ensured.
Existence is ensured if the profit functions for firm 1 and firm v 
are concave in its own output. Since marginal cost for firm 1 and firm 
v are constant, it is sufficient for concavity of each firm’s profit function 
that the final demand z(X ) function be concave, z" <  0. To ensure that 
the reaction functions of firm 1 and firm v intersect, I shall assume the 
following additional technicality: /F _1(0) >  R‘ (0) =  x !,m, where Rl is Vs 
reaction function, i , j  =  \,v, i ^  j. This assumption implies that firm 
Vs output that induces firm j  to produce nothing exceeds Vs monopoly 
output Xl'm.
A sufficient condition for uniqueness of (14) is that the derivative 
of the reaction functions be less than 1 in absolute value. The reaction 
function R\ i =  1, v, is implicitly defined by the first-order conditions





i , j  =  l,v , i ^ j . (15)
From (15), |fï!'| < 1 if |n|,| > Ilÿ . Differentiating the first-order con­
ditions (10) and (11) with respect to the respective rival’s output yields 
n }„ =  z' +  x V ' <  0 and =  pi + x vz"(\ -  tc) =  (1 — fc) (z ' +  xvz") <  0. 
Uniqueness, i.e. \R"\ <  1 is then equivalent to |z'| >  0.
Following Dixit (1986), the stability conditions require




























































































The second-order conditions (12) and (13) can be subsumed under the 
stability conditions (16).15
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions (10) and (11) yields
njjdz1 + Tl\vdxv + njtdt = 0 
-(- n vvdxv + Uvldi =  0
where t stands for either p,tc,tp or pa. In matrix notation,
f  nh n iv \ ( d x ' \ = _ {  n\Ldi \
\ n”i ) \ d x v j  v n vmd i) '
The solution to this system is given by
( d x ' \ = _ i (  n i  n}„ \ / u\Ldi \ 
\dxv )  n V n"i n n )  V K A  J '
(17)
(18)
From (18), (10) and (11), the comparative static effects of an increase in 





nL -njv (l - e) (tp( i - t c))
(+)
<  o for 0 =  1,
and
(19)
dxV - X* - L
xp -  ~dp 0 - K i  + n li (1 -  6) (<p(1 -  tc))
(-)
> 0  for 0 =  1. (20)
From (19) and (20), an increase in p lowers firm l ’s equilibrium refined 
output and raises firm v’s unambiguously only if 0 =  1. In this case, by 
driving p up in stage 1 and thereby raising its rivals cost, the integrated 
firm has a powerful tool to reduce its competitor’s output on the refined 
products market and potentially to install a monopoly. If the integrated 
firm sells a positive amount of crude oil to its own downstream unit, 
a counter effect comes into play that dampens firm l ’s output decrease 
and firm w’s output increase. The total effect depends on the relative




























































































strength of these counteracting effects, and cannot be signed generally. 
However, the incentive to raise its rivals’ cost is weaker (i) in the presence 
of taxation than in the no-tax case, since for tc =  tp =  0, the counter effect 
in (19) and (20) reduces to zero, and (ii) in the case of sales to its own 
subsidiary. If the counter effect becomes strong enough, the integrated 
firm might even find reducing rival’s cost by setting p very low a profitable 
strategy.
The total industry output is decreasing in p, 
l  dx  ̂ dxv\ z'
Xp =  \ dp +  ~dp) =  ft K1 ~  tc) +  (1 -  0) M 1 -  *=))] <  (21)
implying that the final products price z is increasing in p, z'Xp >  0. A 
change in p induces two counteracting effects on the equilibrium response 
of total refining output, where the quantity decreasing effect caused by 
firm l ’s equilibrium reaction is stronger than the induced expansion of 
v's output.
Similarly, an increase in the corporation tax rate tc has ambiguous 
effects as well,
^  =  x l  =  I  [n}„ (tP ((ePa -  c) +  (p(i - e ) ) ) - ( z  +  x*z' -  c) ) ] , (22)
^  ^  [ - n l x (tp ((6p° - c )  +  (p( 1 -  0))) ~ ( z  +  X»z' -  c))] .
(23)
Imagine for a moment a PRT-rate tp of zero. Then, by (22) an increase 
of the CRT-rate would serve to decrease x1 . The effect on xv remains am­
biguous and depends on the relative strength of -n ^  and — (z +  xvz' — c) , 
see (23). The comparative static effects of a change in tp are
^  =  x l  =  1  [ - n } „  (1 -  tc) ((1 -  B)p +  (0pa -  c))] , (24)
and
r1r v 1 r i
-  =  x l  =  -  [n l, (1 -  tc) ((1 -  6)p +  (9 pa -  c))] . (25)
It was argued in section 3 that it is plausible to assume pa > c. Then, the 




























































































i = p i — tc L — tp t =  pa
dx1 /di - +/~ + +
dxv/db + +/~ - -
Table 2: C om parative Statics for 9 =  1
6 say, such that 0 <  9 <  1. Hence, for 9 > 9, (24) has unambiguously a 
positive, and (25) exhibits unambiguously a negative sign. The effect of 
a change in the tax price pa on the Cournot equilibrium refined outputs 
of firms 1 and v is:
^  ^  [ - n l ^  < p (i -  *c)] >o if e > o, (26)
~  =  x ;a =  i  [n{jfl tp( i -  tc)\ < o  if 9 >  o. (27)
An increase in pa serves to increase firm l ’s output, and decreases firm 
u’s output, as long as 6 >  0. These results are intuitively appealing: A 
higher tax price serves as an asymmetric cost increase affecting only the 
integrated firm as long as some crude oil is transferred internally. The 
comparative statics results of equations (19) through (27) are summarized 
in Table 2 for 9 =  1, which is a condition that becomes important in 
section 5.
Suppose that the integrated firm’s output xv(p,tc,tp,pa) is fixed at 
its Cournot equilibrium level. What would the effect of an increase in 
firm l ’s output be on the profit of the integrated firm v. To derive this 
effect, the following function T  is defined as
T{p,tc,tp,pa) =  U\(p,tc :tp,pa)
=  0 \{pa -  p) (fp(l -  tc))] -  (1 -  tc) (z - p ) ,
where (11) was used to substitute for xv. Rewriting (28),
T(p,tc,tp,pa) =  [ ( p - c )  -  {z - c ) ]  +  (z - p ) t c 
+9[{pa - p )  (tp{ 1 -  fc))j.
With the formulation of equation (29), T  has a special meaning: The first 




























































































from sales of crude oil and refined products, respectively. In the absence 
of taxation, (29) becomes T (p) =  (p — c) — (z — c) , and an increase 
in firm l ’s output, given that v’s output remains at the noncooperative 
equilibrium level, increases v’s profit if and only if the profit margin from 
crude oil sales is greater than from refined product sales, or p > z. Under 
the UK oil fiscal system, this simple rule breaks down. Suppose that 
pa =  p. Then, from (29), the integrated firms’ equilibrium profit increases 
in x1 if (p — z )( l  — tc) >  0, or (p — z) > 0. Hence, the existence of a CT 
makes no difference as long as the tax price equals the crude oil price. If 
pa > p, the requirement that (p — c) — (z — c) >  0 for T  >  0 is relaxed, 
and if pa < p, it is severed. Hence, the tax price-crude oil price differential 
exercises influence on the reaction of v’s profit on a change in x l .
5 The Crude Oil Market: Equilibrium 
Vertical Foreclosure Versus Supply
The crude oil market forms the first stage of the game. The integrated 
firm’s strategy set consists of the crude oil price p it charges its down­
stream rival l .16 It is optimising on a derived demand function which is 
implied by fixed-coefficients technology. Since firm v foresees the effect 
its crude pricing action has on the revenue from its refining undertakings, 
its profit can be written as a function of p, tc,tp, and pa :
nv(p,tc,tp,pa) =  xv(p,tc,tp,pa) p(p,tc,tp,pa)
- 6  xv(p: tc,tp:pa) [(p“ - p )  (fp( 1 -  tc))] (30)
+  ( p - c ) ( l - r ) q ( p , t c,tp,pa) .
16 6, being a further potential decision variable, is subject to certain constraints set 
by the OTO’s policy not to accept back-to-back deals. Since the remainder of section 
5 is built around t>’s conduct around the foreclosure point, the constraint imposed by 




























































































The integrated firm’s problem is to pick a price p such that
p G argm axlIv(p,tc,tp,pa)
(*) q{p,tc,tP,pa) > 0  .
s.t. (ii) x T )  =  q(-)
(in) 9 G [0,1].
In (31), the first constraint ensures that firm l ’s input demand can­
not become negative. The second constraint is dictated by the fixed- 
coefficients technology, while the third is a consistency requirement. To 
find the p that maximises (31) write the Lagrangian £  =  IF (p, tc, tp,pa) +  
Aq(p,tc,tp,pa) (it is ensured that constraints (ii) and (iii) are always sat­
isfied) . The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
£ P =  n "(p ,tc,fp,j>“ ) +  XqP(p,tc,tp,pa) = 0  
C\ = q(p,tc,tP,pa) > o, A > 0, £ aA = 0.
Consider the first-order condition at a vertical supply equilibrium, i.e. 
A =  0. From (30), using (11),17
n p =  ( !  -  T) ((P -  c)qP +  9)
+ x v f(l -  tc) z' xj] -  (1 -  9)xv (<p(l -  £ ) )=  0. (33)
's v ^
Pure Tax effect
Before discussing (33), consider the second-order condition for a maxi­
mum of (31). For all jo < p , I assume that IF(-) is strictly concave, where 
p is defined by q(p, tc, tp,pa) =  0 and 9 =  1. For linear final good demand, 
the second-order condition becomes18
n ;p =  |(1 -  Q z '-1 {tp (tp (9 (5 -  A9) -  1) -  9) +  5 (1 -  <p) }  < 0. (34)
For 0 =  0, IIpp <  0 for tp <  0.854, and for 9 =  1, IIpp < 0 for tp < 5/6. For 
any 9 G (0,1), the negative sign of (34) is preserved as long as tp < 0.854. 
Hence, n "p <  0 is ensured for all 9 G [0,1] if tp <  5/6. The requirement
17 For brevity’s sake, I shall omitt the explicitly written functional dependence of 
the variables, except when a variable is evaluated at the foreclosure price p.




























































































tp <  5 /6 was met ever since the current tax regime came into effect, see 
Table 1.
For the benchmark case without a tax system first, (33) takes the 
following form
A " = (P ~  c) gp +  g + z' x\ xv =  0. (35)
Direct Effect Strategic Effect
To facilitate an interpretation of (35), it is useful to notice the different 
effects identified in the literature of a change in a first-stage decision 
variable on firm v’s profit.19 First, the effect of p on 11'’ through the 
integrated firm’s refining stage choice xv(p) is only of second-order by 
applying the envelope theorem. Second, the direct effect o f a change in 
p on v's profit would exists even if p would have no impact on firm l ’s 
behaviour. Shapiro (1989) points out that this direct effect would be the 
only prevailing one in an open-loop equilibrium, where the integrated 
firm takes its refining rival’s strategies as given in both stages.20 In (35), 
the direct effect is simply net marginal revenue which is known from 
standard models of monopoly behaviour. Third, a strategic effect results 
from the influence of p on firm l ’s first period action x1(p), which in 
turn influences firm c ’s profit. Quite generally, the strategic effect can be 
written as x lp. From (19), the sign of xx is known, which is negative 
for 0 =  1. Looking at (35), the strategic effect is unambiguously positive 
for 6 — 1, since in this case z' < 0 ,  xlp <  0, and x v >  0, from which 
it follows that <  o. Compared with the closed-loop solution, the 
strategic effect prescribes that the integrated firm should ’’ overprice” its 
crude oil output. If the strategic effect is sufficiently large, v charges a 
high p such that q =  0, which is the definition of firm 1 to be vertically 
foreclosed. Rewriting (35) yields a modification of the standard mark-up 
pricing rule for a monopoly,
p — c 1 z'xv
P e p
(36)
19See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), Fudenbergand Tirole (1984), and 
Tirole’s (1988) textbook on industrial organisation, chapter 8.
20In a subgame-perfect equilibrium or closed-loop equilibrium, the integrated firm 
only takes its rival’s action as given in refining (second) stage competition, but not 




























































































pwhere e =  —qv-  denotes the derived demand elasticity and the second
term on the right-hand side results from the strategic effect. For a positive 
vertical supply, the left-hand side of (36) must be greater than one. Even 
if v is operating on the elastic part of the derived demand function, it
can be optimal for the integrated firm to foreclose the crude oil market if
z'xv
the strategic term on the right-hand s id e ,-------- >  0, is large enough to
V
make -------  approach one.
V
The first-order condition under taxation (33) shows that an after-tax 
direct effect and an after-tax strategic term are governing firm v’s crude 
pricing choice, where the former is subject to the upstream rate r, and 
the latter only to the downstream CRT-rate tc. The third term in (33) 
represents a pure tax effect on II11 because it has no precedent in (35). 
This tax effect becomes zero either if tp =  0 or if 9 =  1. Rewriting (33) 
so as to make it comparable with (35) yields
p — c
+
(<0  for tp> 0 and 0< 1)
tp (1 - 6 ) x v
e (1 -  tp)p  1 -  t
(>0  for <p>0)
QPP
(37)
For tp >  0 and 9 <  1, the tax effect is strictly negative. It therefore has a 
supply inducing influence on firm v’s optimisation programme. In other 
words, as long as the integrated firm’s downstream unit buys some barrels 
of crude oil on the open market and the PRT-rate is greater than zero, 
the ’’ overpricing” influence emanating from the after-tax strategic effect 
is ’’ diluted” by an amount proportional to the share of crude oil bought 
externally and to tp.
The foreclosure price is implicitly defined by
q(p ,tc,tP,pa) = 0 p =  p{tc, tp,pa) and 9 — 1. (38)
Due to the OTO-rules regarding the non-acceptance of back-to-back 
deals for nomination, setting the crude oil price equal to p has the further 




























































































Now consider (33) at p =p and 9 =  1 :
Hp(p) =  (1 -  t) {(p -  c)qp) +  xv [(1 - t c)z' z j] . (39)
Following the approach introduced by Spencer and Jones (1991), (39) is 
rewritten, using (11), (29), xp =  qp, and 9 =  1:
n ” (p) =  T(p) qp (40)
Equation (40) is a very useful expression to derive explicit conditions for 
vertical supply or foreclosure. At the foreclosure price, a further increase 
in the crude oil price cannot increases firm ids profits, since the indepen­
dent rival’s derived demand is equal to zero at p. On the other hand, if 
a small reduction in the crude oil price results in an increase of IRQ?), 
foreclosing firm 1 is not profit-maximising. Rather, it will set a price 
p < p that corresponds to vertical supply. The integrated firm v engages 
in vertical supply if and only if a reduction in p below the foreclosure 
price p increases ids profit (30). In other words, vertical supply is the 
equilibrium outcome if and only if
n ;(p ) -  T(p) qp <  o.
Due to the fixed-coefficients technology qp =  xp, and by (19) qp is negative 
if 9 =  1. Then, vertical supply is conditional on the sign of the after-tax 
profit-margin function T  defined in (28). The following two cases are 
possible:
(p) I >  ̂ ^  ver^cai suppiy
| < 0 vertical foreclosure
To establish a benchmark outcome, consider the case without taxation 
first.
P roposition  1 (S pen cer and Jones 1991) Suppose that there 
is no taxation, i.e. tc =  tp =  0. Then the integrated oil producer-refiner v 
will vertically foreclose its downstream rival firm 1 from its own crude oil 




























































































P r o o f  Setting tc — tp — 0, the condition for vertical supply can 
be written as
T(j5) =  (p -  c) -  (z(p) -  c) >  0 p > z(p). (41)
From (10), firm 1 produces the final good at p =  p if and only if the crude 
oil price p, representing marginal cost of the first unit of refined output, 
were below the price of refined products 2 which is the marginal revenue 
from selling the first unit of refined outputs. The condition z > p is a 
contradiction of (41) and the integrated firm forecloses its downstream 
rival firm 1 from its crude oil supply.
This result is intuitive: The integrated firm has the leverage, by 
foreclosing its rival from its crude oil supplies, to create a second monopoly 
in refining. It is this monopolisation effect that drives the strategic effect 
that appears in (33) and (35). This result is perfectly in line with related 
observations in the game-theoretic literature.
To see whether the introduction of taxes change the nature of equi­
librium, consider (29) at p :
T(p) =  [ ( p - c )  -  (z -  c)] +  ( z - p ) t c +  (pa - p )  (<p(l -  tc))
=  (Pa ~ P) (tP(1 -  tc)) ~  (1 -  tc) ( z - p ) -
In (37) two price differentials have to be considered by the integrated firm 
in its foreclosure versus supply decision. The first represents the difference 
between the officially assessed tax price and the foreclosure price for crude 
oil, taxed at tp( 1 — tc). The second is the after-tax difference between the 
foreclosure price for crude oil and the refined products price. Since pa is 
set by the OTO and is thus determined exogenously, three cases can be 
distinguished, depending on the difference between pa and p .
Case 1: pa — p This case arises when the tax authority sets
the tax price exactly equal to the foreclosure price. Then, (37) reduces 
to T (p,pa =  p) =  —(1 — tc) (z — p ) . This expression is positive if (1 — 
tc) (p — z) >  0, or if p > z. By Proposition 1, the equilibrium in case 1 is 




























































































Case 2: pa > p This constellation arises when the tax price
exceeds the foreclosure price. Rewriting (37), the condition for vertical 
supply becomes
T(p,pa > p) >  0 «• (pa -  p )tp > z -  p . (43)
From condition (38), z — p >  0, if there exists, for a given a tp > tp
where tv =  4 “ ^  is defined as the PRT-rate at which foreclosure is the 
. p p equilibrium.
Case 3: pa < p If the tax price is set below the foreclosure
price, (37) becomes
T(p,pa < p ) > 0  ( p - p a) tF < ( p - z ) ,  (44)
and for vertical supply to be an equilibrium, (p — z) >  0 since (p — pa) >  0 
and tp >  0. Hence, for case 3, foreclosure is the resultant equilibrium. 
These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
P rop osition  2 The variables and magnitudes affecting the supply 
equilibrium are the relationship between pa, z and p, as well as the PRT- 
rate tp. Depending on the relationship between pa and p, the following 
cases can be distinguished:
1. For pa <  p, the integrated firm v forecloses its independent rival, 
independently of tp.
2. Necessary for vertical supply to arise is the condition pa > p. Due to 
the constraint 0 <  tp <  1, there two sufficient conditions for vertical 
supply: z < pa and tp >  tp =  -pr^- Hence, p <  z < pa must hold 
with strict inequalities in a supply equilibrium. Otherwise, vertical 
foreclosure arises.
Proposition 2 provides a qualification of the tax spinning hypothe­
sis. The informal literature argued that p < pa constitutes the necessary 












































































































































































































absence of transaction costs. Figure 1 illustrates the conditions stated 
by the tax spinning hypothesis for spinning to be profitable. The dashed 
area represents the region in which tax spinning is allegedly profitable. 
The introduction of strategic interaction in the refining industry further 
restricts the parameter space allowing for vertical supply. For an illustra­
tion, assume the following numerical values for (43): pa — 10, p — 5. For 
vertical supply to arise in equilibrium, (10) requires that 2 >  5. Suppose 
now that 2 >  pa, i.e. 2 =  11. Then T  > 0 in (43) would imply tp >  6/5, 
which is impossible. If 2 < pa, say z =  7, T  > 0  were equivalent to 
tp >  3 /5  =  tp. For this case, vertical supply depends on the actual PRT 
rate exceeding the threshold value of 3/5. It is easy to see that if 2 is in 
the neighbourhood of p, tp is rather small (for 2 =  11/2, tp =  1/10), and 
that if 2 is near pa, tp is rather high (z =  9, tp =  4 /5). Figure 2 illus­
trates the scope of vertical supply (tax spinning) in the strategic setting. 
The dashed area illustrates the conditions that are behind vertical supply 
according to Proposition 2.
The conditions under which vertical supply arises in equilibrium 
are much more restricted conditions than was claimed by the informal 
spinning hypothesis. The sufficient condition has no counterpart in Mabro 
et al.’s (1986) argumentation, and Proposition 2 shows that the tax price 
and the PRT-rate must strictly remain above some lower floors for vertical 
supply to be profitable.
An obvious question arises whether the tax price pa can ever exceed 
the refined products price 2. A priori, under the institutional setting of 
section 5 there exists no reason why the tax price should not, in certain 
periods, exceed the refined products prices, fdeally, pa should reflect the 
market price of deals and commodities similar to the transfers of crude oil 
within the integrated firm. In practice, however, it was an administered 
price posted by the British National Oil Company (BNOC) for the pur­
chase of participation crude and determined through bargaining between 
the BNOC and its sellers and buyers. As every adjustment of the tax 
price had to pass through an institutionalised bargaining process of price 
formation, it is unlikely that the tax price adjustment to changing crude 
























































































































































































If the spot and subsequently the refined products price fall sharply,21 and 
the term or tax price reacts only with some delay, circumstances might 
arise where pa > z. thereby creating a temporary incentive for vertical 
supply. Mabro et al. observe a similar pattern in their analysis of episodes 
of tax spinning:
In each case the episode began with a sharp fall in spot 
price, creating an incentive to spin; and in four cases the 
episode ended with a price cut by BNOC (1986:127).
Under the new institutional regime yet to described in section 6, 
the tax price is defined as the average of prices realized in spot and for­
ward deals nominated during a well-specified time period, which might 
even involve some future dates. Now suppose that after a period of high 
crude oil and refined product prices the crude oil price and products price 
drops. The average of high price deals nominated previously reacts only 
sluggishly at the further addition of a lower priced deal. If the oil firm 
has to make a decision towards the end of the nomination period so that 
expected prices of future deals play a minor role, it is perfectly imagin­
able that the average of prices, i.e. pa, exceeds the current lower refined 
products price 2.
T a x  P o l i c y  a n d  V e r t i c a l  F o r e c l o s u r e  Two parameters are cru­
cial for the integrated firm’s incentive to foreclose its rival: the tax price 
pa and the PRT-rate tp. Under both the old institutional regime and the 
new one, although the tax policy makers can define pa, they cannot ’’ fine- 
tune” it to reach some policy targets. This leaves tp as the parameter that 
can be controlled to influence vertical supply relationships. I argue that 
the discretionary policy of the UK tax authorities has provided incentives 
for vertical supply. Ever since the implementation of the Oil Taxation 
Act 1975, tax spinning or vertical supply has been possible for integrated 
oil firms. According to Mabro et al. (1986), the first public reporting of 
tax spinning dates back to April 1981, when Conoco and BP first started




























































































this tax optimisation exercise. The story told by Mabro et al. why tax 
spinning was not perceived earlier than 1981 begins with the Iranian oil 
crisis of 1978/9.22 In its wake, long-term supply contracts were broken 
and for oil firms and traders, looking for new trading tactics and sources 
of oil, the Brent market became attractive. As of January 1981, short sell­
ing of Brent crude was reported for the first time, a strategy that became 
feasible because the integrated oil firms were selling part of their crude oil 
production into the spot market for tax reasons. Since then, it is said, tax 
spinning was practiced whenever the conditions for it were right, which 
of course is usually meant to refer to the informal hypothesis’ condition 
of a positive differential pa — p. This story, however, is incomplete. It 
leaves out the crucial role of the PRT-rate. Table 1 shows for the years 
1978-1980 a substantial increase of tv of around 55 %. This increase in 
the PRT-rate preceded the first publicly reported occurrence of sales of 
crude oil by integrated companies as of the beginning of 1981. By then, 
the PRT-rate tp was as high as 70 %, compared to 45 % the years before 
1978. Proposition 2 suggests that, even if the market conditions were 
favourable for spinning in terms of the ’’ correct” sign of the price differ­
entials (pa > z > p), vertical supply did not emerge before 1981 simply 
because the PRT-rate was too low to make this practice profitable. After 
the increase of the PRT-rate, it was high enough to make vertical supply 
profitable, if the necessary and the sufficient conditions were met. By the 
same token, the reduction of the PRT-rate from 75 % in 1992 to 50 % in 
1993 might mark the end of the traditional tax spinning game.
6 Spinning Under Tax Price Uncertainty 
And Endogeneity
Recent changes in the UK oil taxation regime have introduced further 
restrictions into the tax-spinning game between the oil companies and 
internal revenue. These changes extend to questions of the method of 
valuation and nomination.





























































































Valuation is based on this period
Febr. March 15 April
Figure 3: N o m i n a t i o n  P e r i o d
V a l u a t i o n  For the valuation of output disposed of in a non-arm’s 
length deal, i.e. through an internal transfer from upstream to down­
stream units of an integrated company, the U.K. Oil Taxation Office 
(OTO) has until 1984 considered the contemporary BNOC term price 
as the artificial market reference price for such transactions. In 1984, the 
OTO considered the BNOC term price to be no longer representative. 
After an interim period that created ambiguity about valuation for fiscal 
purposes, the tax authority eventually introduced a new method in 1987 
(see Horsnell and Mabro 1993). The new method defines the assessed 
market value of internally disposed crude as the average of realized prices 
of spot and forward sales of crude oil. The sales contracts that form the 
base on which this average is computed are defined on a temporal basis: 
’’ The relevant sales contracts ... are those entered upon within the period 
beginning at the start of the previous month and ending on the middle 
day of the month in question” (Horsnell and Mabro 1993, p. 63).
Consider the period from February to April, showed in Figure 3. 
The ’’ problem” for the OTO is to assess a value for PRT purposes to 
all barrels of crude oil transferred within integrated companies in March. 




























































































ferred March crude is based on the average of prices established in spot 
sales and forward contracts for March delivery during the period between 
the first of February and the 15 of March, see Figure 3.
N o m i n a t i o n  In the game-theoretic model discusses above, the 
procedure of nomination of contracts for sales in order to establish a mar­
ket price for PRT purposes was straightforward. In line with the practice 
until March 1987, the integrated firm was able to freely optimise by choos­
ing the amount of crude transferred internally or sold in an open market 
transaction. This freedom in principle extended also to the choice which 
forward deals should become wet, but since the model abstracts from for­
ward trading, this problem remains without further consideration. As of 
March 1987, a nomination scheme was introduced by OTO putting a rigid 
constraint on the tax optimisation game played by the integrated oil firms. 
The procedure requires that each upstream producer should nominate a 
sales transaction for PRT purposes within a well-defined nomination win­
dow with a length of two days or four days when there is an intervening 
week-end. Following a prolonged review of North Sea oil trade by the UK 
tax authorities, recent British budget proposals imply a further tighten­
ing of the nomination window. As of January 1st, 1994, the time allowed 
for nominating equity sales is reduced from 48 hours to 24 hours. The 
tightening of the nomination window is expected to yield an extra fiscal 
revenue of about T5mn a year.23
If a producer’s nominations to OTO for a given months exceed its 
total production, i.e. there are no internal transfers,24 than the most 
recent nominations are cancelled until nominated and actual production 
are matched. If crude output is higher than nominations, this difference 
corresponds to a positive quantity of crude oil transferred internally and is 
taxed on the basis outlined above. Horsnell and Mabro (1993) stress that 
the new rules force firms to ’’ take a view about future price movements 
in relation to the price of that deal when they consider whether they
23See Weekly Petroleum Argus WPA, December 6, 1993, for more information.
24This can happen if (i) crude oil produced and subsequently stored above the 
ground at Sullom Voe is now sold, or (ii) if a short forward position with delivery 




























































































should nominate or not” (p. 66). Moreover, ’’ the oil company has no 
simultaneous knowledge of the actual market and the ’market valuation’ 
(the tax price, A.S.) except on the last day of the trading period” (p. 
67), which in the example discusses above would be the 15th of March. 
Since the quality of the forecast of the uncertain tax price improves during 
the six-week period, the nominating producer would prefer to postpone 
all decisions towards the end of this period, which, is not possible given 
lifting, refining, and production constraints. Hence, for a company being 
somewhere between February 1 and March 15, expectations about the 
ex-post computed average price for that very period on which valuation 
is based have to be formed.
T a x  S p i n n i n g  Are the changes in oil taxation outlines in the pre­
ceding sections substantial, i.e. do they impact on the incentives of the 
integrated firm to supply crude to its downstream rival? If a vertically in­
tegrated company were only considering tax incentives in its crude supply 
decision, as is repeatedly suggested by the informal literature,
(...) it will pay the vertically-integrated oil company to 
sell its oil arm’s length whenever it expects the realized mar­
ket price to be lower than the OTO ’s valuation of a non-arm’s 
length deal; and to appropriate the oil whenever it expects 
the realized market price to be higher than the OTO price.
In both cases the vertically-integrated oil company chooses 
to make less pre-tax profits upstream but this is exactly com­
pensated for by higher pre-tax profits downstream. There is 
an overall gain in after-tax profits since the tax rate is lower 
downstream than upstream. (Horsnell and Mabro 1993, . 63).
Does this new condition changes the qualitative results derived for 
the integrated firm’s behaviour at the foreclosure margin? To answer this 
question, consider that the use of the expectations operator indicates that 
future price movements are perceived as uncertain by the spinning firm. 
Horsnell and Mabro (1993) argue convincingly that tax spinning practices 





























































































(...) the number of physical cargoes (given the level of pro­
duction) that will be made available to third parties is likely to 
vary depending on the expectations of integrated companies 
as regards the direction of price changes during each six-week 
computation period (p. 68).
The most important impact these policy changes have is on the 
nature of the tax price pa. It is now an endogenous variable. First, it 
depends on expectations formed by the integrated oil firm about future 
prices; and second, it is based on an average of prices agreed upon in spot 
or forward contracts that have been entered by the nominating integrated 
oil firm. In formal terms, define the expectation of a crude price in period 
j  as of time f, where j  > t, as Ej \pj |f]. The endogenous tax price, 
computed over the whole six-week period (or two week period, if only 
spot sales are considered) is now defined as the average value of realized 
and expected arm’s length prices of nominated deals (=  total production 
of firm v) :
pa := A(p,t) Z > «  +  E  Ei\P) I*]
_i=l j=t+1
, i =  j  =  t + l ,
(45)
The endogenous tax price has the following ’’ degenerate” cases:
A M - {  . (46)
{ A(p,T) =  fELiPi  if t =  T
The first case for t — 0 defines the tax price as a complete expectational 
term. Such is the situation for an integrated oil firm at the morning of 
the first of February, where T stands for the 15th of March and where it 
possesses no information about the price path yet to arise over the six- 
period horizon. The second degenerate case describes the situation for 
the firm at t =  T, when it has simultaneous knowledge of A(p,T)  andp^. 
Expectations do not have to formed at this decision point. The necessary 
and sufficient condition for tax spinning to arise at a certain point in time 
t according to Horsnell and Mabro becomes




























































































It is safe to assume that the nomination window closes at the end of the 
day of the sales (recall the 24 hours window) and that all external sales 
are nominated for PRT purposes.25 Then, subscript t denotes the day 
on which the produced crude output has either to be sold on the market 
or internally transferred. Since only spot sales are explicitly analysed, 
and spot contracts call for immediate delivery, spot contracts for March 
delivery could only be made in March.
P rop osition  3 Suppose the following set of assumptions hold:
1. The integrated firm is risk-neutral, i.e. its utility function is linear 
in profits;
2. The impact of a small change of p at the foreclosure point, dp, 
has no impact on the average of prices of deals nominated before t,
\zLiPi-
3. The formation of expectations is exogenous.
Given assumptions 1. -3., the integrated firm’s foreclosure versus 
supply decision is not affected by the new tax policy rules. Proposition 2 
holds, with pa :=  A(p,t).
P r o o f  By assumption 1, actual values are merely replaced by their 
expected values in the profit function (30). By assumption 2 and 3, A(p, t) 
appears in the first-order condition (31) and the successive equations as 
a completely exogenous variable, in perfect correspondence to the role of
pa.
25Since the model treats cargoes of Brent as being traded only once, and since no 
other reason exists for cargoes to be disposed of externally than for tax spinning, this 





























































































In a two-stage game where the integrated producer acts first by credibly 
committing itself to a crude oil price that constitutes the input cost for an 
unintegrated downstream rival, and where the second stage is a Cournot 
game between the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival, vertical 
foreclosure is the equilibrium outcome if there were no taxes (Proposition 
1). Under the UK tax regime, vertical supply arises when the tax price is 
greater than the refined products price that in turn must exceed the fore­
closure price and if the PRT-rate is high enough so as to exceed a certain 
threshold level (Proposition 2). Proposition 3 shows that the recent in­
troduction of new rules concerning crude oil valuation and nomination of 
deals for tax purposes does not affect the underlying incentives to supply 
or foreclose the crude oil market at the foreclosure margin. The analy­
sis shows that the conditions behind vertical supply are more restrictive 
than the informal tax spinning hypothesis has claimed. According to the 
latter, a positive differential between the tax price and the crude price 
would be necessary and sufficient for tax spinning to become profitable. 
Both the tax spinning hypothesis and Proposition 2 point in the same 
direction concerning the ’’ right market conditions” for tax spinning to 
arise. Episodes where the tax price exceeds the crude (foreclosure) price 
are likely to be episodes where the tax price also exceeds the refined prod­
ucts price. The spinning hypothesis has, however, paid no attention to 
the role of the PRT-rate to provide proper incentives for vertical supply. 
It is argued that the substantial increase in the PRT-rate during the pe­
riod 1978-1980 made spinning profitable for the first time. By the same 
token, the reduction in the rate from 75 % in 1992 to 50 % in 1993 might 
have brought the rate down below the threshold level above which vertical 
supply becomes profitable. Since tax spinning is considered to be a major 
drive behind the crude oil trading of the integrated firms, the recent tax 
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